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This paper investigates the link between the optimal level of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms’ liquid
assets and uncertainty. We develop a partial equilibrium model of precautionary demand
for liquid assets showing that ﬁrms alter their liquidity ratio in response to changes in
either macroeconomic or idiosyncratic uncertainty. We test this hypothesis using a panel
of non-ﬁnancial US ﬁrms drawn from the COMPUSTAT quarterly database covering the
period 1993–2002. The results indicate that ﬁrms increase their liquidity ratios when
macroeconomic uncertainty or idiosyncratic uncertainty increases.
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1 1 Introduction
“As a result of the foregoing, Honda’s consolidated cash and cash equivalents
amounted to ¥547.4 billion as of March 31, 2003, a net decrease of ¥62.0 billion
from a year ago. ... Honda’s general policy is to provide amounts necessary
for future capital expenditures from funds generated from operations. With the
current levels of cash and cash equivalents and other liquid assets, as well as
credit lines with banks, Honda believes that it maintains a suﬃcient level of
liquidity.”1
“Standard & Poor’s said those reserves have declined severely over the last year
and blamed the drain, in part, on Schrempp’s massive spending spree, which in-
cluded taking a 34 percent stake in debt-ridden Japanese automaker Mitsubishi
Motors. According to an article in Newsweek magazine, DaimlerChrysler’s cash
reserves – a cushion against any economic turndown — will dwindle to $ 2 bil-
lion by the end of the year, down 78 percent from two years ago. That compares
with cash reserves of more than $13 billion at rivals General Motors and Ford,
the magazine said.”2
Why should a company maintain considerable amounts of cash, as in Honda’s case? Why
is a decline in cash reserves problematic as in DaimlerChrysler’s case? What determines
the optimal level of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms’ liquidity? In the seminal paper of Modigliani and
Miller (1958) cash is considered as a zero net present value investment. There are no beneﬁts
from holding cash in a world of perfect capital markets lacking information asymmetries,
transaction costs or taxes. Firms undertake all positive NPV projects regardless of their
level of liquidity.3
However, due to the presence of market frictions, we generally observe considerable vari-
ation in liquidity ratios among diﬀerent types of ﬁrms according to their size, industry and
1Citation. http://world.honda.com/investors/annualreport/2003/17.html
2Citation. http://www.detnews.com/2000/autos/0012/04/-157334.htm
3Keynes (1936) suggests that ﬁrms hold liquid assets to reduce transaction costs and to meet unexpected
contingencies as a buﬀer. This cash buﬀer allows the company to maintain the ability to invest when the
company does not have suﬃcient current cash ﬂows to meet investment demands.
2degree of ﬁnancial leverage. For instance, several studies suggest that for liquidity con-
strained ﬁrms, liquid asset holdings are positively correlated with proxies for the severity of
agency problems. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that ﬁrms facing information asymmetry-
induced ﬁnancial constraints are likely to accumulate cash holdings. Kim and Sherman
(1998) indicate that ﬁrms increase investment in liquid assets in response to increase in the
cost of external ﬁnancing, the variance of future cash ﬂows or the return on future invest-
ment opportunities.4 Harford (1999) argues that corporations with excessive cash holdings
are less likely to be takeover targets. Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) develop a
liquidity demand model where ﬁrms have access to investment opportunities but cannot
ﬁnance them. They show that ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms’ cash ﬂow sensitivity increases
during recessions, while ﬁnancially unconstrained ﬁrms’ cash ﬂow sensitivity is unaﬀected
by the business cycle.5
We aim to contribute to the literature on corporate liquidity by considering an additional
factor which may have important eﬀects on ﬁrms’ cash management behavior: the uncer-
tainty they face in terms of both macroeconomic conditions and idiosyncratic risks. In ex-
plaining the role of macroeconomic uncertainty on cash holding behavior, Baum, Caglayan,
Ozkan and Talavera (2006) develop a static model of cash management under uncertainty
with a signal extraction mechanism. In their empirical investigation, they ﬁnd that ﬁrms
behave more homogeneously in response to increases in macroeconomic uncertainty.6 How-
ever, their model implies predictable variations in the cross-sectional distribution of corpo-
rate cash holdings and does not make predictions about the individual ﬁrm’s optimal level
of liquidity. Furthermore, they do not consider the impact of idiosyncratic uncertainty on
the ﬁrm’s cash holdings.
In this paper, we complement Baum et al. (2006) by investigating the impact of macroe-
conomic uncertainty as well as idiosyncratic uncertainty on the cash holding behavior of
non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. We provide a theoretical and empirical investigation of the ﬁrm’s deci-
4See also Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999), Mills, Morling and Tease (1994) and Bruinshoofd
(2003).
5See also Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) on the eﬀects of monetary policy on ﬁnancial policies regarding
the use of debt.
6In a recent paper Bo and Lensink (2005) suggests that presence of uncertainty factors changes the
structural parameters of the Q-model of investment.
3sion to hold liquid assets. Our theoretical model formalizes the individual ﬁrm’s precaution-
ary demand for cash and assumes that the ﬁrm maximizes its value by investing in capital
goods and holding cash to oﬀset an adverse cash ﬂow shock. The optimal level of cash
holdings is derived as a function of expected return on investment, the expected interest
rate on loans, the ﬁnite bounds of their cash ﬂow distribution, the probability of getting a
loan and their initial resources. We then parameterize optimal cash holdings and turn to
the data to see if there is empirical support for the predictions of the model that managers
change levels of liquidity in response to changes in both macroeconomic and idiosyncratic
uncertainty. To do that, we match ﬁrm-speciﬁc data with information on the state of the
macroeconomic environment.
To test the model’s predictions, we apply the System GMM estimator (Blundell and
Bond, 1998) to a panel of US non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms obtained from the quarterly COMPUSTAT
database over the 1993–2002 period. After screening procedures our data include more
than 30,000 manufacturing ﬁrm-quarter observations, with 700 ﬁrms per quarter. Since the
impact of uncertainty may diﬀer across categories of ﬁrms, we also consider four sample
splits. Our main ﬁndings can be summarized as follows. We ﬁnd strong evidence of a
positive association between the optimal level of liquidity and macroeconomic uncertainty
as proxied by the conditional variances of inﬂation and the index of leading indicators.
US companies also increase their liquidity ratios when idiosyncratic uncertainty increases.
Results obtained from sample splits conﬁrm ﬁndings from earlier research that ﬁrm-speciﬁc
characteristics are important determinants of cash-holding policy.7
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical
model of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms’ precautionary demand for liquid assets. Section 3 describes
our data and empirical results. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 Theoretical Model
2.1 Model Setup
We develop a two period cash buﬀer-stock model which describes how the ﬁrm’s manager
should vary the optimal level of liquid assets in response to macroeconomic and/or id-
7For instance, see Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) and the references therein.
4iosyncratic uncertainty. We assume that the manager maximizes the expected value of the
ﬁrm.
At time t the ﬁrm has initial resources Wt−1 to be distributed between capital investment
(It) and cash holdings (Ct). Cash holdings may include not only cash itself but also low-
yield highly liquid assets such as Treasury bills. For simplicity, the ﬁrm does not ﬁnance
any other activities. Investment is expected to earn a gross return in time t + 1, denoted
E[R]t+1.8 Liquid asset holdings, Ct, are required to guard against a negative cash-ﬂow
shock.9 Prior to period t + 1 the ﬁrm faces a random cash-ﬂow shock ψt, distributed
according to a symmetric triangular distribution with mean zero where ψt ∈ [−Ht,Ht].10
Here Ht can be interpreted as a measure of uncertainty faced by the ﬁrm’s managers.
There are three possible cases to consider, distinguished by a second subscript on each
variable. They are graphically depicted in Appendix B. First, the ﬁrm can experience a
positive cash-ﬂow shock that occurs with probability p1 and has conditional expectation
ψt,1. This corresponds to the right half of the ﬁgure.
p1 = Pr(ψt > 0) = 1/2







The ﬁrm’s value in this case is








Second, the ﬁrm could be exposed to a negative cash-ﬂow shock yet may have enough liquid
assets to meet it. In the ﬁgure, this corresponds to a cash ﬂow shock between −C and 0.
This shock occurs with probability p2 and has conditional expectation ψt,2:













8For simplicity we assume that distribution of returns is independent from all other variables’ distribu-
tions.
9The model ignores the transaction motive for holding cash, and the optimal amount of liquid assets is
zero in the absence of costly external ﬁnancing.
10The triangular distribution is chosen as an approximation to the normal distribution, which does not
have a closed-form solution.
5The value of the ﬁrm in the case when −Ct < ψt < 0 is equal to





Finally, the size of the negative shock could exceed the available liquid assets of the ﬁrm.
This event occurs with probability p3 and has conditional expectation ψt,3:
p3 = Pr(−Ct > ψt) =
H2









In this case the ﬁrm must seek external ﬁnance and borrow −(ψt + Ct) at the gross rate
Xt. However, there is a probability st ∈ [0,1] that the ﬁrm will be extended suﬃcient
credit to prevent negative net worth. This implies that with probability (1 − st) the ﬁrm
declares bankruptcy and its value at time t + 1 is zero.11 In the ﬁgure, this corresponds to
a cash-ﬂow shock between −H and −C. For simplicity we assume that the probability of
being granted suﬃcient credit is independent of the distribution of cash-ﬂow shocks. The
value of the ﬁrm in the last case is equal to
Wt+1,3 = st (ItE[R]t+1 + Ct + ψt,3 + Xt(ψt,3 + Ct)) (3)
= st
"







Given the three possible cases, the manager’s objective is to maximize the expected value
of the ﬁrm in period t + 1. Deﬁning investment as It = Wt−1 − Ct, the manager’s problem














































11We ignore the liquidation value of the ﬁrm’s real assets, which can be assumed seized by creditors.
6where Ct is the only choice variable. Hence, maximizing equation (4) with respect to Ct,




2.83Ht − 2.00(1 − st)(Wt−1 + 2Ht)E[R]t+1 − 1.76stHt(Xt + 1) +
√
D
1.41 − 2.0E[R]t+1(1 − st) − 0.59st(Xt + 1)
(5)
Note that equation (5) is non-linear. Hence, to test if the model will receive support from
the data, we linearize it around the steady state equilibrium:
ˆ Ct = α1c Wt−1 + α2 b Rt+1 + α3c Ht + α4c Xt + α5ˆ st (6)
where the coeﬃcients α1 −α5 are functions of the model’s parameters. The expected signs
of the coeﬃcients are discussed in the following subsection.
2.2 Model solution
The analytical solution for the ﬁrm’s optimal cash holdings is a nonlinear function of initial
resources, Wt−1; the expected gross return on investment, E[R]t+1; the gross interest rate
for borrowing, Xt; the bounds of the triangular distribution of cash shocks, Ht and st, the
probability of acquiring suﬃcient credit when bankruptcy threatens. Hence the implicit
solution is a complicated function of the model’s parameters, for which we cannot obtain
comparative static results. To address this problem, we resort to graphical analysis to
determine the signs of α, the parameters in equation (6).
Figure 1 presents the relationship among optimal cash holdings, the gross interest rate
for external borrowing and the bounds of the cash-ﬂow shock distribution which captures
the degree of uncertainty faced by the ﬁrm. The ﬁgure is plotted setting initial resources
Wt−1 = 30 and gross returns E[R]t+1 = 1.3 for two diﬀerent probabilities of raising external
funds: st = 0 and st = 1. In the ﬁrst panel (st = 0), when the ﬁrm is subjected to a relatively
large negative shock it declares bankruptcy with certainty. When st = 1 the ﬁrm receives
external ﬁnancing with probability one, as depicted in the second panel. If no external
12Given its quadratic structure, there are two possible solutions to the optimization problem. We work
with the solution that implies non-negative cash holdings, as the other solution has no economic meaning.







t+1 + (7.03stXt + 28)H
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7ﬁnancing is available (st = 0), cash holdings are high and insensitive to the gross interest
rate (Xt): Xt is irrelevant to the ﬁrm. The ﬁrm always holds more cash regardless of
the cost of external ﬁnancing to guard against the need for external funds. However, if
the ﬁrm can always acquire external ﬁnancing, cash holdings are sensitive to the cost of
funds. In this case, the ﬁrm prefers to hold less cash when funds can be acquired cheaply
in comparison to the case where it is more expensive. We also note that the level of cash
holdings increases as the bounds of the distribution of cash shocks Ht increases, raising the
magnitude of expected cash ﬂow shocks.
In Figure 2, we depict the impact of expected returns and changes in the bounds of the
cash-ﬂow shock on the cash holding behavior of the ﬁrm. The ﬁgure is drawn setting the
gross interest rate for external borrowing, Xt = 1.3 and initial resources Wt−1 = 30 while
allowing the probability of raising funds to take the values st = 0 and st = 0.5. In this case
the optimal level of cash holdings decreases as the expected return on investment E[R]t+1—
the opportunity cost of holding liquid assets—increases. An increase in expected returns
induces the manager to channel funds towards proﬁtable investment opportunities, ceteris
paribus. Furthermore, cash holdings are more sensitive to changes in expected returns when
st = 0.5 compared to st = 0. However, the impact of a change in the bounds of the cash
ﬂow shock distribution is more complicated. When expected returns are low cash holdings
increase as the bounds of the cash-ﬂow shock distribution widen. However, when expected
return on investment is much higher optimal cash holdings ﬁrst increase in response to an
increase of the bounds of the cash-ﬂow shock distribution and then decrease. Thus, cash
holdings exhibit a complex non-linear relationship to uncertainty in the face of changes in
expected returns.
In Figure 3, we present the relationship among cash holdings, Ct, the bounds of the cash-
ﬂow shock distribution Ht and the probability of acquiring suﬃcient credit when threatened
with bankruptcy, st. We plot the ﬁgure setting initial resources Wt−1 = 30 and the gross
returns to Rt+1 = 1.3 while the gross interest rate for external loans is set to Xt = 1.3 or
Xt = 1.6. Notice that cash holdings decrease in response to an increase in the probability
of getting a loan (a higher st). With better odds of external ﬁnancing, ﬁrms are likely to
hold less cash, ceteris paribus. However, when the costs of external ﬁnancing are high, cash
8holdings are less sensitive to the probability of acquiring external ﬁnancing.
Finally, Figure 4 describes the relationship among cash holdings, initial resources and
the bounds of the cash ﬂow shock distribution. This ﬁgure is constructed setting the gross
return E[R]t+1 = 1.3 and the gross interest rate on external borrowing to Xt = 1.3 while we
allow the probability of accessing external funds st to equal 0 or 0.5 as in the earlier cases.
Here we observe that a ﬁrm with higher initial resources will hold more cash. Moreover, as
the bounds of the distribution of cash-ﬂow shocks widen, the ﬁrm tends to increase its cash
holdings due to the precautionary motive.
Given our interpretations of the graphical analysis, our theoretical model predicts posi-
tive signs for α1 (initial resources) and α4 (interest rate on external borrowing) and negative
signs for α2 (return on investment) and α5 (probability of being granted suﬃcient credit).
The sign of α3 (bounds of the cash-ﬂow shock distribution) depends on the levels of the
ﬁrm’s variables.
2.3 Parameterization
In order to ﬁnd out whether or not the data will support the theoretical model, we must
parameterize the coeﬃcients associated with the variables in our model. First consider the
ﬁrm’s expected returns. We assume that the ﬁrm maximizes proﬁt, deﬁned as
Π(Kt,Lt) = P(Yt)Yt − wtLt − ft
where P(Yt) is an inverse demand function, ft represents ﬁxed costs, Lt is labor and wt is
wages. The ﬁrm produces output Y given by the production function F(Kt,Lt).
Expected return on investment E[R]t+1 is equal to the expected marginal proﬁt of
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9Figure 1: Plot of Ct against Xt and Ht (st = 0 and st = 1,Wt−1 = 30,E[R]t+1 = 1.3)
10Figure 2: Plot of Ct against E[R]t+1 and Ht (st = 0 and st = 0.5,Wt−1 = 30, Xt = 1.3)
11Figure 3: Plot of Ct against st and Ht (Xt = 1.3 and Xt = 1.6,Wt−1 = 30,E[R]t+1 = 1.3 )
12Figure 4: Plot of Ct against Wt−1 and Ht (st = 0 and st = 0.5,E[R]t+1 = 1.3, Xt = 1.3)
13where E[S] denotes expected sales in period t + 1. We assume rational expectations and
replace expected sales at time t + 1 with actual sales at time t + 1 plus a ﬁrm-speciﬁc
expectation error term, νt, which is orthogonal to the information set available at the time
when optimal cash holdings are chosen. Moreover, we allow for diﬀerent proﬁtability of
capital across ﬁrms and industries, adding an industry speciﬁc term, κ, and a ﬁrm speciﬁc
term, ω. In linearized form we have14





+ κ + ω + νt (8)
The ﬁrm’s initial resources are Wt−1 = Ct−1 + RtIt−1 + ψt−1, where It−1 is investment
in period t−1, Ct−1 is cash in the previous period, Rt is the gross return on investment in
period t and ψt−1 is the level of the cash ﬂow shock most recently experienced by the ﬁrm.
Hence, linearized initial resources are equal to
ˆ Wt−1 = ζ1 ˆ Ct−1 + ζ2ˆ It−1 + ζ3 ˆ ψt−1 (9)
The interest rate on borrowing in the case when the ﬁrm does not have enough cash to
cover a negative cash ﬂow shock is taken to be proportional to the risk-free interest rate,
TBt:
ˆ Xt = δ TBt (10)
We employ macroeconomic uncertainty and idiosyncratic uncertainty as determinants





t + β1β2cov(τt,t) (11)
where τ2
t denotes a proxy for the degree of macroeconomic uncertainty while 2
t is a measure
of idiosyncratic uncertainty. Normalizing the covariance term (a second-order magnitude)
to zero, the expression takes the form





Finally, the probability of being able to acquire suﬃcient credit when threatened with
bankruptcy, st, is parameterized as
ˆ st = γ1LIt + γ2E[ ˆ R]t+1 (13)
14We proxy the ﬁrm’s capital stock K with total assets, TA.
14where LIt is the index of leading indicators: a measure of overall economic health. E[R]t+1
is the ﬁrm’s expected return on investment. Both a stronger economic environment and a
higher expected return on investment increase the ﬁrm’s probability of acquiring suﬃcient
credit if threatened with bankruptcy (see Altman (1968), Liu (2004)).
Substituting the parameterized expressions into equation (6) yields











t + α4δTBt + α5γ1LIt + (α2 + α5γ2)(κ + ω + ν).
After normalization of cash holdings, debt and investment by total assets we derive our





















φ4LIt−1 + φ5TBt−1 + φ6 ˆ ψt−1 + φ7ˆ 2
it + φ8ˆ τ2
t−1 + κ0 + ω0 + ν0
it
where φ0 − φ8 are complicated functions of the model’s parameters and 2
it, τ2
it−1 represent
idiosyncratic and macroeconomic uncertainty, respectively. COMPUSTAT provides end-of-
period values for ﬁrms, so that we use lagged proxies for macroeconomic variables in the
regressions instead of contemporaneous proxies to be consistent with respect to the timing of
events. Our ﬁrst hypothesis—that macroeconomic uncertainty aﬀects ﬁrms’ cash holdings
behavior—can be tested by investigating the signiﬁcance of φ8 in equation (14):
H0 : φ8 = 0 (15)
H1 : φ8 6= 0.
The second hypothesis relates to the role of idiosyncratic uncertainty on the optimal level
of cash holdings. This hypothesis can be tested by investigating the signiﬁcance of φ7 in
equation (14):
H0 : φ7 = 0 (16)
H1 : φ7 6= 0.
We expect that ﬁrms’ managers will ﬁnd it optimal to change their level of liquid asset
holdings in response to variations of uncertainty about the macroeconomic environment.
15Hence, we should be able to reject H0 : φ8 = 0. Similarly, if an increase in idiosyncratic
uncertainty causes an increase in cash holdings, the second hypothesis may be rejected as
well.
2.4 Identiﬁcation of macroeconomic uncertainty
The literature suggests various methods to obtain a proxy for macroeconomic uncertainty.
In our investigation, as in Driver, Temple and Urga (2005) and Byrne and Davis (2002),
we use a GARCH model to proxy for macroeconomic uncertainty. We believe that this
approach is more appropriate compared to alternatives such as proxies obtained from mov-
ing standard deviations of the macroeconomic series (e.g., Ghosal and Loungani (2000))
or survey-based measures based on the dispersion of forecasts (e.g., Graham and Harvey
(2001), Schmukler, Mehrez and Kaufmann (1999)). While the former approach suﬀers
from substantial serial correlation problems in the constructed series the latter potentially
contains sizable measurement errors.
In an environment of sticky wages and prices, unanticipated volatility of inﬂation will
impose real costs on ﬁrms and their workers. In this context, we consider a volatility
measure derived from changes in the consumer price index (CPI) as a proxy for the macro-
level uncertainty that ﬁrms face in their ﬁnancial and production decisions. To evaluate the
robustness of our ﬁndings, a second proxy is employed: the volatility of the index of leading
indicators. We build a generalized ARCH (GARCH(1,1)) model for each series where the
mean equation is an autoregression, as described in Table 1. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant ARCH
and GARCH coeﬃcients for both time series. The conditional variances derived from this
GARCH model are averaged to the quarterly frequency and then employed in the analysis
as alternative measures of macroeconomic uncertainty, ˆ τ2
t . Table 2 reports the correlation
between these series to be relatively low (0.2054). It appears that they reﬂect diﬀerent
aspects of the macroeconomic environment.
2.5 Identiﬁcation of idiosyncratic uncertainty
One can employ diﬀerent proxies to capture ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk. For instance, Bo and Lensink
(2005) use three measures: stock price volatility, estimated as the diﬀerence between the
16highest and the lowest stock price normalized by the lowest price; volatility of sales mea-
sured by the coeﬃcient of variation of sales over a seven–year window; and the volatility of
number of employees estimated similarly to volatility of sales. Bo (2002) employs a slightly
diﬀerent approach, setting up the forecasting AR(1) equation for the underlying uncertainty
variable driven by sales and interest rates. The unpredictable part of the ﬂuctuations, the
estimated residuals, are obtained from that equation and their three-year moving average
standard deviation is computed. Kalckreuth (2000) uses cost and sales uncertainty mea-
sures, regressing operating costs on sales. The three-month aggregated orthogonal residuals
from that regression are used as uncertainty measures.
In contrast to the studies cited above, we proxy the idiosyncratic uncertainty by com-
puting the the standard deviation of the closing price for the ﬁrm’s shares over the last nine
months. This measure is calculated using COMPUSTAT items data12, 1st month of quarter
close price; data13, 2nd month of quarter close price; data14, 3rd month of quarter close
price and their ﬁrst and second lags. To check the robustness of our results with respect to
a proxy for idiosyncratic uncertainty, we estimated a second proxy based on the standard
deviation of the sales-to-assets ratio over a seven-quarter window. As Table 2 shows, these
two proxies (2
t) for idiosyncratic uncertainty are essentially uncorrelated.
To ascertain that the measure captured by this method is diﬀerent from that used to
proxy macroeconomic uncertainty described in Section 2.4, we compute the correlations
between the two sets of measures. As Table 2 illustrates, none of the correlations between
the τ2
t and 2
t measures exceed 0.02 in absolute value. Therefore, the macroeconomic and
idiosyncratic measures uncertainty are virtually orthogonal.
3 Empirical Implementation
3.1 Data construction
For the empirical investigation we work with Standard & Poor’s Quarterly Industrial COM-
PUSTAT database of U.S. ﬁrms. The initial database includes 201,552 ﬁrm-quarter char-
acteristics over 1993–2002. We restrict our analysis to manufacturing companies for which
COMPUSTAT provides information. The ﬁrms are classiﬁed by two-digit Standard Indus-
trial Classiﬁcation (SIC). The main advantage of the dataset is that it contains detailed
17balance sheet information.
In order to construct ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables we utilize COMPUSTAT data items Cash and
Short-term Investment (data1), Depreciation (data5), Total Assets (data6), Income before
Extraordinary Items (data8), Capital Expenditures (data90 item), Sales (data2 item) and
Operating Income before Depreciation (data21 item). Cash ﬂow is deﬁned as the sum of
Depreciation and Income before Extraordinary Items. A measure of cash-ﬂow shocks, ψ, is
calculated as the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the ratio of cash ﬂow to total assets.
We apply several sample selection criteria to the original sample. The following ob-
servations are coded as missing values in our estimation sample: (a) negative values for
cash-to-assets, sales-to-assets and investment-to-assets ratios; and (b) values of investment-
to-assets ratio and the idiosyncratic uncertainty measures lower than the ﬁrst percentile
or higher than the 99th percentile. We employ the screened data to reduce the potential
impact of outliers upon the parameter estimates. After the screening and including only
manufacturing sector ﬁrms we obtain on average 700 ﬁrms’ quarterly characteristics.15
Descriptive statistics for the quarterly means of cash-to-asset ratios along with invest-
ment and sales to asset ratios and ψ are presented in Table 3. From the means of the sample
we see that ﬁrms hold about 10 percent of their total assets in cash. This amount is sizable
and similar to that reported in Baum et al. (2006).
The empirical literature investigating ﬁrms’ cash-holding behavior has identiﬁed that
ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics play an important role.16 We might expect that a group of
ﬁrms with similar characteristics (e.g., those ﬁrms with high levels of leverage) might behave
similarly, and quite diﬀerently from those with diﬀering characteristics. Consequently, we
split the sample into subsamples of ﬁrms to investigate if the model’s predictions would
receive support in each subsample. We consider four diﬀerent sample splits in the interest
of identifying groups of ﬁrms that may have similar characteristics relevant to their choice of
liquidity. The splits are based on ﬁrm size, durable-goods vs. non-durable goods producers,
markup and ﬁrms’ growth rate. The durable/non-durable classiﬁcations only apply to ﬁrms
in the manufacturing sector (one-digit SIC 2 or 3). A ﬁrm is considered durable if its primary
15We also use winsorized versions of balance sheet measures and receive similar quantitative results.
16See Ozkan and Ozkan (2004).
18SIC is 24, 25, 32–39.17 SIC classiﬁcations for non-durable industries are 20–23 or 26–31.18
For the markup split, we compute markup as the ratio of sales to sales net of operating
income (before depreciation).
The sample splits for ﬁrm size, markup and growth rate are based on ﬁrms’ average
values of the characteristic lying in the ﬁrst or fourth quartile of the sample.19 For instance,
a ﬁrm with average total assets above the 75th percentile of the distribution will be classed
as large, while a ﬁrm with average total assets below the 25th percentile will be classed as
small. As such, the classiﬁcations are not mutually exhaustive.
Table 4 gives the number of ﬁrm-quarters for each subsample used in our analysis.
According to the size category, for example, there are 1,508 low-growth large ﬁrm-quarters
and 2,451 high-growth large ﬁrm-quarters. Although there is some overlap among the
subsample classiﬁcations, it is far from complete among the four sets of groupings.
In order to investigate the extent to which cash-to-assets ratios vary among diﬀerent
subsamples we calculate mean comparison tests. The estimated p-values for two-sample
t-tests and Mann–Whitney two-sample statistics20 are displayed in Table 5. As expected,
ﬁrms in diﬀerent subsamples maintain quite diﬀerent levels of liquidity. On average, small
ﬁrms hold twice as much cash as do their large counterparts, perhaps reﬂecting that they
have constrained access to external funds. Durable-goods makers hold slightly more cash
on average than do non-durable goods makers. High-growth (and low-markup) ﬁrms hold
signiﬁcantly more cash than low-growth (and high-markup) counterparts, perhaps reﬂecting
their greater cash ﬂow needs. The variations in subsample average liquidity ratios will
naturally inﬂuence those ﬁrms’ sensitivity to macroeconomic and idiosyncratic uncertainty.
17These industries include lumber and wood products, furniture, stone, clay, and glass products, pri-
mary and fabricated metal products, industrial machinery, electronic equipment, transportation equipment,
instruments, and miscellaneous manufacturing industries.
18These industries include food, tobacco, textiles, apparel, paper products, printing and publishing, chem-
icals, petroleum and coal products, rubber and plastics, and leather products makers.
19We have also experimented with using presample categorization. Our qualitative ﬁndings from subsam-
ples are not aﬀected.
20The Mann–Whitney two-sample test, also known as the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, evaluates the hypothesis
that two independent samples are drawn from populations with the same distribution.
193.2 Empirical results
Estimates of optimal corporate behavior often suﬀer from endogeneity problems, and the
use of instrumental variables may be considered as a possible solution. We estimate our
econometric models using the system dynamic panel data (DPD) estimator. System DPD
combines equations in diﬀerences of the variables with equations in levels of the variables.
In this “system GMM” approach (see Blundell and Bond (1998)), lagged levels are used
as instruments for diﬀerenced equations and lagged diﬀerences are used as instruments for
level equations. The models are estimated using a ﬁrst diﬀerence transformation to remove
the individual ﬁrm eﬀect.
The reliability of our econometric methodology depends crucially on the validity of
instruments. We check it with Sargan’s test of overidentifying restrictions, which is asymp-
totically distributed as χ2 in the number of restrictions. The consistency of estimates also
depends on the serial correlation in the error terms. We present test statistics for ﬁrst-order
and second-order serial correlation in Tables 6–8, which lay out our results on the links
between macroeconomic uncertainty, idiosyncratic uncertainty and the liquidity ratio. For
the “all ﬁrms” sample, we also present the full set of coeﬃcients corresponding to the α
parameters of equation (14). In the interest of brevity, we only present the coeﬃcients
on the uncertainty variables, corresponding to equations (15) and (16) for the subsample
splits.21
Table 6 displays results the Blundell–Bond one-step system GMM estimator with the
conditional variances of CPI inﬂation and the index of leading indicators as proxies for
macroeconomic uncertainty. Idiosyncratic uncertainty is proxied by the volatilities of clos-
ing equity prices or the sales-to-assets ratio. An increase in macroeconomic uncertainty
(measured by either proxy) leads to an increase in ﬁrms’ cash holdings, with a highly sig-
niﬁcant eﬀect. Idiosyncratic uncertainty is also important, with a signiﬁcant and positive
coeﬃcient estimate. Hence, our ﬁndings support the hypotheses that heightened levels of
macroeconomic and idiosyncratic uncertainty lead to an increase in the ﬁrm’s liquidity ra-
tio. The results also suggest signiﬁcant positive persistence in the liquidity ratio with a
21Full results are available on request.
20coeﬃcient of 0.79. A negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect of the expected sales-to-assets ratio is
also in accordance with our expectations. This ratio may be considered as a proxy for the
ﬁrm’s expected return on investment. When the expected opportunity cost of holding cash
increases, ﬁrms are likely to decrease their liquidity ratio. Improvements in the state of the
macroeconomy (proxied by the index of leading indicators) or increases in the cost of funds
(via the Treasury bill rate) will reduce the ﬁrm’s demand for cash.22 Overall the data for
this broadest sample support the basic predictions of the model that we laid out in section
2.
3.3 Results for subsamples of ﬁrms
Having established the presence of a positive role for macroeconomic uncertainty on ﬁrm’s
cash holdings, we next investigate if the strength of the association varies across groups of
ﬁrms with diﬀering characteristics. It is important to consider that the average cash-to-
asset ratios of ﬁrms with diﬀerent characteristics vary widely. The last lines of Tables 7 and
8 present the sample average liquidity ratios (µC/TA) for each subsample.
The ﬁrst two columns of Table 7 reports results for small and large ﬁrms. Based on
the point estimates, the former ﬁrms are highly sensitive to the changes in volatility of CPI
inﬂation, with large ﬁrms display a considerably smaller sensitivity. Small ﬁrms also have a
much larger coeﬃcient for idiosyncratic uncertainty. The greater sensitivity of small ﬁrms
could be explained by the fact that smaller ﬁrms are more likely to be ﬁnancially constrained.
As Almeida et al. (2004) indicate, ﬁnancially unconstrained ﬁrms have no precautionary
motive to hold cash; their cash holding policies are indeterminate. In contrast, for ﬁnancially
constrained ﬁrms, any change in the level of uncertainty that aﬀects managers’ ability to
predict cash ﬂows should cause them to alter their demand for liquidity. We see that small
ﬁrms are much more sensitive to both forms of uncertainty, and hold much more cash on
average than do large ﬁrms.
We ﬁnd an interesting contrast in the results for durable goods makers and non-durable
goods makers, reported in columns 3 and 4. While both categories of ﬁrms exhibit positive
22Although the analytical model predicts that the Treasury blll rate should be positively related to the
liquidity ratio, the model assumes that the ﬁrm cannot lend, thus ignoring the opportunity cost of cash
holdings.
21and signiﬁcant eﬀects for macroeconomic uncertainty, durable goods makers also exhibit
sensitivity to idiosyncratic uncertainty, which appears to have no signiﬁcant eﬀect on non-
durable goods ﬁrms. Durable goods makers’ production involves greater time lags and
larger inventories of work-in-progress, which may imply a greater need for cash as well as a
greater sensitivity to uncertainty.
The ﬁrst two columns of Table 8 present results for high-markup ﬁrms: those in the top
quartile of the markup ratio versus their low-markup counterparts. Both categories of ﬁrms
are sensitive to idiosyncratic uncertainty, with that sensitivity being almost twice as large for
the high-markup ﬁrms, who presumably face tighter cash-ﬂow constraints. Macroeconomic
uncertainty is also weakly signiﬁcant for the high-markup ﬁrms.
The last two columns report results for high-growth and low-growth ﬁrms, respectively.
Here again, high-growth ﬁrms display sensitivity to idiosyncratic uncertainty, unlike their
low-growth counterparts. These ﬁrms display signiﬁcant sensitivity to macroeconomic un-
certainty, which may reﬂect the smaller levels of cash held by those ﬁrms.
In summary, we may draw several conclusions from the analysis of these four sets of
subsamples. Variations in idiosyncratic uncertainty have a strong eﬀect on the liquidity
ratios of small ﬁrms, durable-goods makers, ﬁrms experiencing high growth and ﬁrms with
high or low markup. Variations in macroeconomic uncertainty have signiﬁcant eﬀects on
liquidity of large, low-growth ﬁrms, nondurable goods makers and ﬁrms with high markup
ratios. The subsample evidence buttresses our ﬁndings from the “all ﬁrms” full sample and
further strengthens support for the hypotheses generated by our analytical model.
4 Conclusions
We set out in this paper to shed light on the link between the level of liquidity of man-
ufacturing ﬁrms and uncertainty measures. Based on the theoretical predictions obtained
from a simple optimization problem, we ﬁrst show that ﬁrms will increase their level of cash
holdings when macroeconomic or idiosyncratic uncertainty increases. This result conﬁrms
the existence of a precautionary motive for holding liquid assets among non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
Next we empirically investigate if our model receives support from a large ﬁrm-level dataset
of U.S. non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms from Quarterly COMPUSTAT over the 1993–2002 period using
22the dynamic panel data methodology. The results suggest positive and signiﬁcant eﬀects
of both macroeconomic and idiosyncratic uncertainty on ﬁrms’ cash holding behavior, sup-
porting the hypotheses posed in the paper. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms unambiguously increase their
liquidity ratio in more uncertain times. The strength of their response diﬀers meaningfully
across subsamples of ﬁrms with similar characteristics. When the macroeconomic envi-
ronment is less predictable, or when idiosyncratic risk is higher, companies become more
cautious and increase their liquidity ratio.
Our results should be considered in conjunction with those of Baum et al. (2006) who
predict that during periods of higher uncertainty ﬁrms behave more similarly in terms of
their cash-to-asset ratios. Taken together, these studies allow us to conjecture that as
either macroeconomic or idiosyncratic uncertainty increases the total amount of cash held
by non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms will increase signiﬁcantly, with negative eﬀects on the economy. The
idea behind this proposition is that cash hoarded but not applied to potential investment
projects can keep the economy lingering in a recessionary phase. During recessionary periods
ﬁrms generally are more sensitive to asymmetric information problems; cash hoarding will
exacerbate these problems and delay an economic recovery.
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25Appendix A. Construction of macroeconomic and ﬁrm speciﬁc measures
The following variables are used in the empirical study.
From the Quarterly Industrial COMPUSTAT database:




DATA8: Income before extraordinary items
DATA12: 1st month of quarter close price
DATA13: 2nd month of quarter close price
DATA14: 3rd month of quarter close price
DATA21: Operating income before depreciation
DATA90: Capital Expenditures
From International Financial Statistics:
64IZF: Industrial Production monthly
From the DRI–McGraw Hill Basic Economics database:
DLEAD: index of leading indicators
FYGM3: Three-month U.S. Treasury bill interest rate
26Appendix B. Geometry of Cash-Holding shock
27Table 1: GARCH proxy for macroeconomic uncertainty
Lead. Indic. CPI Inflation
















Note: OPG standard errors in parentheses. Models are ﬁt to monthly CPI inﬂation and the detrended index
of leading indicators. ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%











STOCK,t 0.0020 -0.0881 1.0000
2
SALE,t -0.0234 -0.0117 -0.0469 1.0000
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics, 1993Q1–2002Q4
All ﬁrms µ σ2 p25 p50 p75 N
C/TAt 0.1179 0.1719 0.0148 0.0462 0.1476 30,885
I/TAt 0.0350 0.0344 0.0120 0.0249 0.0463 29,765
S/TAt 0.2951 0.2006 0.1963 0.2715 0.3625 30,803
ψt 0.0004 0.0242 -0.0057 0.0009 0.0069 25,100
2
STOCK,t 0.0334 0.0342 0.0120 0.0234 0.0420 30,159
2
SALE,t 0.0404 0.0502 0.0161 0.0276 0.0485 23,846
τ2
CPI,t 0.0207 0.0083 0.0145 0.0165 0.0291 30,885
τ2
LEAD,t 0.0482 0.0084 0.0415 0.0462 0.0519 30,885
Note: p25, p50 and p75 represent the quartiles of the distribution, N is sample size (number of ﬁrm-quarters),
while µ and σ
2 represent its mean and variance respectively.
Table 4: Cross-Classiﬁcation of Subsamples
Markup Growth Manufacturers
Low High Low High Non-dur Durab
Size
Small 4,322 820 2,605 1,656 3,254 4,679
Large 757 3,784 1,508 2,451 4,035 4,188
Manufacturers
Non-dur 2,989 4,558 3,082 3,668




This table displays ﬁrm-quarter cross-classiﬁcations for the various criteria used for sample categorizations.
29Table 5: Cash-to-asset subsamples
µ N t M-W
Small Size 0.1967 7610 0.0000 0.0000
Large Size 0.0782 7222
Non-durable Manufacturers 0.1145 13061 0.0026 0.0000
Durable Manufacturers 0.1205 17824
Low Markup 0.1999 7426 0.0000 0.0000
High Markup 0.1366 8934
Low Growth 0.1368 6818 0.0000 0.0000
High Growth 0.1633 7524
Note: The table presents the average cash-to-asset ratios for subsamples and tests for the diﬀerences of
means. N denotes the number of ﬁrm-quarters in each subsample. P-values for the two-sample t test and
Mann–Whitney test are presented as t and M-W, respectively.
30Table 6: Determinants of Corporate Liquidity: All Firms
Dependent variable: C/TAt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
C/TAt−1 0.7906∗∗∗ 0.7883∗∗∗ 0.7955∗∗∗ 0.7930∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.025)
I/TAt−1 -0.0505∗∗∗ -0.0455∗∗ -0.0538∗∗∗ -0.0516∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
S/TAt+1 -0.0605∗∗∗ -0.0623∗∗∗ -0.0644∗∗∗ -0.0663∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
ψt−1 0.0679∗∗∗ 0.0644∗∗∗ 0.0719∗∗ 0.0692∗∗







LIt−1 -0.0012∗∗∗ -0.0008∗∗∗ -0.0008∗∗∗ -0.0006∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TBt−1 -0.0010∗∗∗ -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0003







Sargan 0.35 0.46 0.21 0.30
AR(1) -12.68∗∗∗ -12.65∗∗∗ -11.68∗∗∗ -11.65∗∗∗
AR(2) 0.75 0.73 1.43 1.41
N 22,172 22,172 18,872 18,872
Note: The equation includes constant and industry dummy variables. Asymptotic robust standard errors are
reported in the brackets. Estimation by System GMM using the DPD package for Ox. Sargan is a Sargan–
Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions (p-value reported). AR(k) is the test for k-th order autocorrela-
tion. Instruments for System GMM estimations are B/Kt−3 to B/TAt−5, CASH/TAt−2 to CASH/TAt−5,
I/TAt−2 to I/TAt−5, S/TAt−2 to S/TAt−5 and ∆S/TAt−1, ∆CASH/TAt−1, and ∆I/TAt−1 .* signiﬁcant
at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
31Table 7: Determinants of Corporate Liquidity: Sample splits I
Dependent variable: C/TAt
Small Large Durable Non-durable
ﬁrms ﬁrms manufacturers manufacturers
2
STOCK,it 0.3125∗∗∗ 0.0822∗∗∗ 0.1104∗∗∗ 0.0185
(0.096) (0.026) (0.028) (0.019)
τ2
CPI,t−1 0.2037 0.1402∗∗ 0.1962∗∗∗ 0.2227∗∗∗
(0.148) (0.066) (0.068) (0.074)
Sargan 1.00 1.00 0.24 0.25
AR(1) -7.41∗∗∗ -6.07∗∗∗ -9.98∗∗∗ -8.17∗∗∗
AR(2) 1.35 1.49 1.31 -0.11
N 5,339 4,857 12,858 9,314
µC/TA 0.1967 0.0787 0.1205 0.1145
Note: Every equation includes constant, ψi,t−1, S/TAi,t+1, I/TAi,t−1, C/TAt−1, LIt−1, TBt−1 and industry
dummy variables. Asymptotic robust standard errors are reported in the brackets. Estimation by System
GMM using the DPD package for Ox. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
Table 8: Determinants of Corporate Liquidity: Sample splits II
Dependent variable: C/TAt
High Low High Low
Markup Markup growth growth
2
STOCK,it 0.0881∗∗∗ 0.1428∗∗∗ 0.0888∗∗∗ 0.0460
(0.032) (0.050) (0.030) (0.043)
τ2
CPI,t−1 0.1586∗ 0.2435 0.1796 0.2137∗
(0.092) (0.161) (0.122) (0.111)
Sargan 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
AR(1) -6.05∗∗∗ -7.32∗∗∗ -7.079∗∗∗ -6.02∗∗∗
AR(2) -1.03 1.10 1.46 1.02
N 4,716 4,902 5,046 4,780
µC/TA 0.1366 0.1999 0.1633 0.1368
Note: Every equation includes constant, ψi,t−1, S/TAi,t+1, I/TAi,t−1, C/TAt−1, LIt−1, TBt−1 and industry
dummy variables. Asymptotic robust standard errors are reported in the brackets. Estimation by System
GMM using the DPD package for Ox. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
32